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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
Geoffrey M. Drake"
and Madison H. Kitchens...
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2011 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit did not signal any new trends in the interpretation and
application of the Federal Rules of Evidence,' which comes as no
surprise given that the Rules have been in effect since 1975. The 2011
term, however, did include a case of first impression for the court and
several cases applying well-established law to new and unique factual
scenarios. Several of these cases resulted in unpublished opinions
bearing no precedential weight but, nevertheless, offering guidance to
the practitioner in future cases.'
While the admissibility of hearsay testimony was not the subject of
any groundbreaking decisions this past year, arguably the year's biggest
evidence blockbuster concerned the Confrontation Clause,' in which the
en banc court construed a defendant's right to probe a witness's bias.
The court addressed the admissibility of lay opinion testimony under

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S.,
1989); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992).
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Virginia (B.A., 2002); Vanderbilt University Law School (J.D., 2005).
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Duke University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 2004); Harvard Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2010).
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit evidence law during the prior survey period, see W.
Randall Bassett & Susan M. Clare, Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV.
1163 (2011).

2. See Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
3.
4.

See 11TH CIR. ApP. P. 36-2, 11TH CIR. I.O.P. 7.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Rule 701' in several cases, including two involving convictions for
materially aiding terrorist plots, two involving mortgage fraud, and one
involving the testimony of a plaintiffs physicians in a product liability
action. Although issues relating to the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony under Rule 7026 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' were less prominent on the circuit's docket than in years past,
the court did address such issues in two tort cases. As always, Rule
403's" balancing of probative value and potential prejudice was a
frequent source of dispute in cases before the Eleventh Circuit this past
year. Less commonly invoked evidentiary rules, ranging from authentication requirements to juror misconduct, also consumed the court's
attention in 2011, particularly in two high-profile cases involving a
former Alabama governor and actor Wesley Snipes.
Notably, last year also witnessed a restyling of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which became effective on December 1, 2011.9 The purpose
of the restyling was "to make the rules clearer and easier to read,
without changing substantive meaning.""o In other words, the Amendments should not impact Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedents, though time will tell whether changed wording leads to changed
interpretations.
II.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: IMPROPER QUESTIONING

This year's Survey begins by examining an interesting case of first
impression, one requiring the court to pass judgment on a persuasive
line of prosecutorial questioning: so-called "were-they-lying" questions.
The defendant in United States v. Schmitzn was convicted of mail
fraud and federal-funds theft after she allegedly "abused her position as
state legislator to obtain employment" with a federally funded program
for at-risk youths. 12 On appeal, defendant Suzanne Schmitz contended

5. FED. R. EVID. 701.
6. FED. R. EvID. 702.
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. FED. R. EvID. 403.
9. See Letter from John G. Roberts to John A. Boehner & Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Apr.
26, 2011), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2011/04-Apr/FRE.Restyling.4-2611SCT.pdf. Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court traditionally
promulgates the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), as enacted by
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648 (1988).
10. Report of the Judicial Conference, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
27 (Sept. 2010), availableat http://federalevidence.com/downloads/Restyle-Rules/2010-09Standing.Committee.Report.to.the.Judicial.Conference.September.2010.pdf.
11. 634 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2011).
12. Id. at 1251.
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that, during her cross-examination, the prosecution impermissibly
demanded her to opine on the truthfulness of previous witnesses.
Specifically, when Schmitz attempted to explain various discrepancies
between her testimony and the testimony provided by a dozen other
witnesses, the prosecutor asked her whether the other witnesses had
lied.'" The prosecutor later referred to this line of questioning in
closing arguments, suggesting to the jury the improbability that the
defendant was the only person telling the truth in the face of numerous
contradicting accounts.14
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred in
allowing the prosecutor to pose the "were-they-lying" questions."
Although acknowledging that Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a)" permits
a witness to testify about another witness's general reputation for
truthfulness or dishonesty, 7 the court stated that the rule does not
allow a witness to declare that another witness is lying in a particular
instance.'" The court further pronounced that "were-they-lying
questions have little or no probative value because they seek an answer
beyond the personal knowledge of the witness," in contravention of Rule
602.19 Moreover, the court concluded that such questions run afoul of

13.

The court provided a representative example:

Q. (by the prosecutor:) [Liet's get a list going of everybody you say is lying, okay?
Seth Hammett. He's a liar?
A. I said I-what I answered was my answer is different from his. I never called
him a liar.
Q. Did he tell the truth when he said that you came to him and asked him to put
money in the budget to fund your job?
A. No, he did not.
Q. He lied?
A. I never used the word "lie."
Q. Why not?
A. I just don't like the word.
Q. So he didn't tell the truth. Does that make you feel better?
Id. at 1267 (alteration in original).
14. Id. at 1267-68.
15. Id. at 1268.
16. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
17. Id. Rule 608(a) provides: "A witness's credibility may be attacked or supported by
testimony about the witness's reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness's character for
truthfulness has been attacked." Id.
18. Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1268.
19. Id. Rule 602 provides, in relevant part, that "[a] witness may testify to a matter
only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602.

1240

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Rule 401's20 relevancy requirement 2 1 because "one witness's opinion
that another person has or has not lied does not make it more or less
likely that the person actually lied.""
The court articulated other prudential concerns militating against the
admission of were-they-lying questions. For example, the court declared
that "were-they-lying questions invade the province of the jury, as
credibility determinations are to be made by the jury, not the testifying
witness."2 3 In addition, such questions put testifying defendants in a
"no-win situation," in which "[t]he defendant must either accuse another
witness of lying or undermine his or her own version of events. 2 4
Although this might constitute an effective prosecutorial strategy, it may
also mask alternative explanations for testimonial inconsistencies, such
as "lapses in memory, differences in perception, or a genuine misunderstanding."2
Lastly, the court characterized were-they-lying questions as argumentative because "often their primary purpose is to make the defendant
It is often immaterial how the defendant
appear accusatory."26
responds, the court suggested, because the prosecutor has already
achieved the "predominate purpose" of "makling] the defendant look
bad. 27 In clearly denouncing these types of questions by prosecutors
in criminal cases, the court did not suggest whether the same reasoning
would lead the court to the same decision in a civil case.
Although the Eleventh Circuit held that "it is improper to ask a
testifying defendant whether another witness is lying," it nevertheless

20. FED. R. EVID. 401.
21. "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action." Id.
22. Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1269.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. In this regard, other courts have distinguished were-they-lying questions from
similar questions that ask the defendant to appraise another witness's veracity. See
United States v. Gaines, 170 F.3d 72, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that prosecutor can
permissibly ask defendant if another witness is "'wrong,'" so long as he avoids using "the
'l' word"); United States v. Gaind, 31 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Asking a witness whether
a previous witness who gave conflicting testimony is 'mistaken' highlights the objective
conflict without requiring the witness to condemn the prior witness as a purveyor of
deliberate falsehood, i.e., a 'liar.'").
26. Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1269.
27. Id. Notably, the court did not discount the possibility that were-they-lying
questions might be appropriate in other contexts, such as when a defendant has already
opened the door to such line of questioning "'by testifying on direct that another witness
was lying."' Id. at 1270 (quoting United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507,512 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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denied Schmitz's evidentiary challenge.2 8 Because Schmitz's counsel
did not object to the were-they-lying questions at trial, or the prosecution's related comments in closing argument, the court analyzed
29 The
Schmitz's challenge under the plain error standard of review.
court noted that, even though the weight of authority from other circuits
suggested the impropriety of were-they-lying questions," neither the
Eleventh Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court had previously
ruled on the issue." Accordingly, the court held that the district court
did not commit plain error."
III. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Just as a criminal defendant may be prejudiced when a court allows
improper questioning, a defendant's rights may also be violated when a
court permits too little questioning. The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution
"shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . ... "" To enable the effective exercise of this right, the Confron-

tation Clause" mandates that a defendant be afforded the opportunity
to probe a witness's bias or motivation to lie. Courts have struggled to

28. Id. at 1268, 1271.
29. Id. at 1268.
30. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that
"asking one witness whether another is lying is inappropriate" because "[such questions
invade the province of the jury and force a witness to testify as to something he cannot
know, i.e., whether another is intentionally seeking to mislead the tribunal"); United States
v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 846 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) ("Because the evaluation
of witness credibility is the province of the jury, it is improper to ask one witness to
comment on the veracity of the testimony of another witness.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423,438 (5th Cir. 2003) (characterizing werethey-lying questions as "inappropriate"); United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1219-20
(9th Cir. 1999) (concluding prosecutor utilized improper cross-examination tactic by forcing
defendant to call U.S. marshal a liar); United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871 (D.C. Cir.
1995) ("[I]t is. . . error for a prosecutor to induce a witness to testify that another witness,
and in particular a government agent, has lied on the stand."); United States v. Akitoye,
923 F.2d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It is not the place of one witness to draw conclusions
about, or cast aspersions upon, another witness'[s] veracity. The 'was-the-witness-lying'
question framed by the prosecutor in this case was of that stripe. It should never have
been posed. . . .")(citations omitted); United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 209 (2d Cir.
1987) (stating that "prosecutors have been admonished time and again to avoid statements
to the effect that, if the defendant is innocent, government agents must be lying").
31. Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1271.
32. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
34. Id.
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find an appropriate balance between this constitutional requirement and
the gate-keeping function of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Supreme Court has declared that a defendant establishes a
Confrontation Clause violation when "[a] reasonable jury might have
received a significantly different impression" of a witness's credibility if
a prohibited line of questioning had been permitted." At the same
time, the Supreme Court has been mindful of countervailing evidentiary
concerns, including a trial court's authority "to impose reasonable limits
on such cross-examination based on concerns about .

.

. harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'[s safety, or interrogation
that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."" The Eleventh Circuit
recently sought to clarify the contours of these opposing principles in
Childers v. Floyd." Sitting en banc, the court vacated a prior panel's
broad reading of the Confrontation Clause, opting instead for an
expansive interpretation of a trial court's inherent discretion to place
limits on cross-examination.
As discussed in last year's Survey," defendant Wyon Dale Childers
was a Florida county commissioner convicted of bribery.40 At trial,
Childers's counsel sought to impeach the testimony of the prosecution's
key witness, Willie Junior, a fellow county commissioner whom Childers
allegedly bribed for his vote to approve the purchase of a soccer
complex.4 1 Junior had earlier entered into a plea agreement that
granted him partial immunity in exchange for his testimony. In a prior
trial, Junior testified against Joe Elliot, the soccer complex owner who
After Elliot's
had allegedly arranged the kickback payments. 42
acquittal, and with Childers's trial pending, Junior augmented his
testimony with additional details he had not previously provided. In
light of these revisions, the government sought to revoke its plea
agreement, which required Junior to provide truthful and complete

35. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986).
36. Id. at 679.
37. 642 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
38. Id. at 966, 977-78.
39. Last year's Survey primarily addressed the panel opinion in Childers. See W.
Randall Bassett & Susan M. Clare, Evidence, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 62 MERCER L. REV.
1163, 1171-73 (2011). In this year's Survey, we chiefly concentrate our discussion on the
Eleventh Circuit's en banc opinion.
40. Childers, 642 F.3d at 958.
41. Id. at 958, 960-61.
42. Id. at 958.
43. Id. at 958-59. The court cited four ways in which Junior altered his testimony
between trials. These alterations likely raised the prospects of conviction because,
according to Junior's revised account, the bribe's terms had been expressly articulated by
Childers (not merely implied, as per Junior's prior testimony). Id.
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statements. After the trial court declined its request for revocation, the
prosecution filed a motion in limine to prevent the introduction of Elliot's
acquittal into evidence in Childers's case. The trial court ruled that
evidence relating to the acquittal and subsequent plea revocation
attempt were inadmissible. Childers was ultimately convicted by a jury
and sentenced to forty-two months in jail.44
After exhausting his state court appeals, Childers sought federal
habeas relief, challenging his conviction on Confrontation Clause
grounds." The federal district court denied the habeas petition," but
an Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, holding that "thetrial court's restrictions of Junior's cross-examination substantively frustrated [Childers's]
attempts to expose Junior's potential motivations for altering his prior
testimony"-motivations which "lie at the heart of" a defendant's
confrontation rights.47 After a poll, the Eleventh Circuit agreed to hear
the issue en banc."
Reviewing the state court's adjudication through the deferential lens
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),49 the en banc court concluded that the state court's exclusion of
the evidence was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the
Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause precedents." In so holding, the

44. Id. at 959-63.
45. Id. at 965.
46. See Childers v. Floyd, No. 3:07cv243, 2008 WL 2945555, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. July 24,
2008) (magistrate judge's report and recommendation denying habeas petition); Childers
v. Floyd, No. 3:07cv243, 2008 WL 4371322, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2008) (district court
order adopting magistrate judge's report and recommendation).
47. See Childers v. Floyd, 608 F.3d 776, 793 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated by Childers v.
Floyd, 625 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
48. Childers, 625 F.3d at 1320.
49. Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered tits. of the U.S.C.).
AEDPA places significant constraints on a federal court's ability to grant habeas relief to
prisoners held in state custody. Most notably, AEDPA provides that a federal court shall
not grant habeas relief on "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings" unless the state court's decision was (1) "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of,clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2006).
A threshold issue on appeal concerned whether AEDPA deference was even required.
See Childers, 642 F.3d at 967-71. The Eleventh Circuit's resolution of this issue is beyond
the scope of this Survey. We note merely that the precedential impact of Childers may be
limited by the habeas posture of the case. A future court facing a similar fact pattern on
direct review might accord less deference-without necessarily violating circuit precedent-to
a trial court's restrictions on a defendant's cross-examination.
50. Childers,642 F.3d at 977.
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court examined three Supreme Court cases-Davis v. Alaska," Delaware
v. Van Arsdall," and Olden v. Kentucky"-which analyzed the extent
to which trial courts may bar cross-examination into a witness's possible
biases without violating a defendant's confrontation rights." According
to the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation, these Supreme Court cases
collectively established two "rules": (1) "trial courts may not prohibit all
questioning into witnesses' biases"; and (2) "trial courts have wide
discretion to limit cross-examination when they have allowed the
defendant to expose some evidence of bias."" So long as the Florida
District Court of Appeal did not flout these rules in upholding Childers's
conviction, he was not entitled to habeas relief.
The en banc majority observed that, although the jury never learned
about Elliot's acquittal or the prosecution's plea revocation attempt, the
trial judge permitted Childers's counsel to cross-examine Junior about
other aspects of his alleged bias." For instance, the jury was apprised
of the terms of Junior's plea agreement and the substantial reduction in
potential sentence he received for his testimony." Furthermore, the
jury heard testimonial evidence about the inconsistencies between
Junior's prior statements and his embellished account at trial."
Because the jury was aware of at least some aspects of Junior's possible
motive to lie, the court concluded that Childers's case was readily
distinguishable from Davis, Van Arsdall, and Olden, in which the trial
courts had completely barred cross-examination into a witness's bias."
Nevertheless, Childers contended that the Elliot acquittal and the
attempted plea revocation constituted separate sources of bias distinct
from the bias created by the plea agreement itself.6 o The Florida
District Court of Appeal had concluded that the attempted revocation
and the acquittal were inextricably linked to the plea agreement. As a
result, all three effectively expressed the same bias and were not
independent sources of bias for separate points of cross-examination.61
The Eleventh Circuit majority acknowledged that a trial court cannot
withstand a Confrontation Clause challenge by permitting cross-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

415 U.S. 308 (1974).
475 U.S. 673 (1986).
488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam).
Childers, 642 F.3d at 973.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 977.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 975.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 978.
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examination into one source of bias while foreclosing all inquiry into a
separate source.62 However, because Supreme Court precedent did not
define a source of bias, the Florida court had license under AEDPA to
adopt its own reasonable interpretation.6 3 Accordingly, the court
agreed with the Florida court's reasoning."
Judge Barkett's dissenting opinion65-joined by Judge Martin-examined the Confrontation Clause issue de novo because she
disagreed with the majority's holding that the case warranted AEDPA
deference.66 According to Judge Barkett, the trial court impermissibly
limited the scope of Childers's cross-examination.67 In her view, jurors
could have reached markedly different credibility assessments had they
been exposed to the excluded evidence: "Believing that a witness has
now recalled additional facts, or even generally favors one side, leaves
a jury with a much less damaged and different impression than if the
jury believed that the witness was motivated to intentionally fabricate
specific pieces of incriminating evidence." The dissent also accused
the majority of misconstruing the holdings of Davis, Van Arsdall, and
Olden as dicta." The dissent surmised that, under the majority's
reading of Supreme Court precedent, trial courts could adopt overly
malleable definitions of bias in which wholly disparate motives would all
qualify as the "same general bias."70 This resulted in a "much too
cramped view" of the Confrontation Clause."
IV.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Although most witness testimony involves the recital of facts and
narratives, the Federal Rules of Evidence also permit "opinion testimony" from both lay and expert witnesses." Federal Rule 70173 requires

62. Id. at 977-78 (citing United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir.
1992)).
63. Id. at 978.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 988 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Judge Wilson filed a concurring opinion in
which he objected to the majority's "overbroad" articulation of AEDPA's "adjudication on
the merits" requirement, but agreed that the trial court's restriction on cross-examination
did not violate the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 980-88 (Wilson, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 988-92 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (discussing AEDPA issue).
67. Id. at 993.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 994.
70. Id. at 994-95.
71. Id. at 995.
72. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
73.

FED. R. EVID. 701.
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that lay opinion testimony be: "(a) rationally based on the witness's
perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony
or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702."" In essence, Rule 701 requires a party to navigate between
presenting testimony so specialized that it qualifies as expert testimony
and presenting testimony so lacking in observational substance as to
invade the province of the jury.
This precarious balance was well illustrated in 2011 in United States
v. Jayyousi.7 ' This high-profile case involved the appeals of alleged
"dirty bomber" Jos6 Padilla and his two co-defendants, who were
convicted of providing material support to terrorists. One of the more
contentious issues in the case concerned whether testimony provided by
the government's key witness, FBI Agent John Kavanaugh, was properly
admitted as lay opinion testimony.76 Agent Kavanaugh proffered his
interpretations of alleged code words employed by the defendants to
mask their terrorist plotting." The defendants contended that Agent
Kavanaugh's testimony violated Rule 701 because he was not present
during the intercepted phone calls and, as a result, could not have
formed a rationally based perception of their meanings. Instead, Agent
Kavanaugh's testimony was based primarily on his review of wiretap
summaries and transcripts that had been translated from Arabic into
English-documents that were largely already admitted into evidence.
In rejecting the defendants' arguments, the court declared that the
Eleventh Circuit had "never held that a lay witness must be a participant or observer of a conversation to provide testimony about the
To the
meaning of coded language used in the conversation."70

74. Id. In 2000, the Advisory Committee amended Rule 701 by adding subsection (c),
intending "to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will
be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing."
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note (2000 amendment); Cf. FED. R. EVID. 702 ("A
witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.").
75. 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011).
76. Id. at 1091-92.
77. Id. at 1095. Agent Kavanaugh testified that the defendants, who suspected their
phone lines were being monitored, used words such as "tourism" to signify jihad, "students"
to refer to the Taliban, and "the first area" to denote Afghanistan. Id.
78. Id. at 1101-02.
79. Id. at 1102.
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contrary, the court had previously held that testimony was "rationally
based on the perception of the witness" even in instances in which the
witness did not himself create the documents or participate in the
activity about which he testified.o In so holding, the court cited cases
in which an FBI financial analyst reviewed and summarized financial
documents" and in which a businessman examined the billing records
of another company.8 2
The Eleventh Circuit also determined that Agent Kavanaugh's
testimony satisfied the "helpfulness" prong of Rule 701(b).8 According
to the court, the testimony at issue added contextual understanding for
the jury by connecting the code words to discrete acts of material
support, including checks and wire transfers." The court distinguished
this case from United States v. Cano," circuit precedent in which a
testifying government agent interpreted the meaning of symbols used in
a defendant's phone book." In Cano, the Eleventh Circuit barred the
testimony because the jury could have easily deciphered the code
themselves. By contrast, Agent Kavanaugh's five-year investigation
enabled him to reach inferences the jurors could not readily draw."
Lastly, and importantly, Agent Kavanaugh limited the scope of his
testimony to inferences that he developed during the Padilla investigation itself, not based on training he acquired over years in the field."
In the majority's estimation, this aspect rendered his testimony
sufficiently removed from the type of technical, specialized knowledge
that Rule 701(c) properly confines to expert testimony.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Barkett did not dispute the majority's
reasoning on this latter point.89 Instead, she focused her criticism on
subparts (a) and (b) of Rule 701, contending that Agent Kavanaugh's lay
opinion testimony "was not based on firsthand knowledge" and "was
merely the government's closing argument in disguise."'o According to
Judge Barkett, Agent Kavanaugh's testimony was not rationally based
on his perception because he was neither "a personal participant in a
conversation as an undercover agent" nor "a listener to a conversation

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. (citing United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006)).
See id. (citing United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 1103.
Id.
289 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2002).
See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1120 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1119-20.
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while observing a defendants' [sic] behavior in real time to coordinate
the conversation with the conduct."
Furthermore, Judge Barkett concluded that Agent Kavanaugh's
testimony was not helpful within the meaning of Rule 701 because he
"never explained what knowledge or perception he gained during the
investigation that allowed him to interpret the conversations any better
than the jury."92 Instead, the dissent proclaimed that Agent Kavanaugh's testimony offered jurors little more than an exercise in "choosing
up sides."
Questions concerning the proper scope of lay opinion testimony were
also at issue in United States v. Augustin,94 another case involving
defendants convicted of conspiring to provide material support to
terrorists.95 This time, however, the defendants complained that the
district court had unduly restricted the testimony of a witness called
upon to interpret jargon. The witness was a professor of Inner City
Studies who had been immersed in Chicago's gang scene as a youth. As
a consequence, he claimed a familiarity with its cultural and linguistic
habits. The district court permitted the professor to comment on some
subjects, such as his observations on gang attire or the fact that he had
heard certain gang words used outside of gang contexts. Yet, the court
precluded him from testifying on other assorted topics, predominately
relating to the manner in which gang terminology had diffused to the
wider popular culture of Chicago." On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the professor was properly permitted to speak only upon
matters about which he had firsthand knowledge, concluding that the
district court "carefully distinguished between proper lay testimony
based on perception, and impermissible opinion testimony based on
expertise."

91. Id. at 1123. Judge Barkett contrasted the case with United States v. Novaton, 271
F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 2001), where law enforcement officers testified that the defendants'
references to a "fifteen year old girl" was code language signifying fifteen kilograms of
cocaine. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1123 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Unlike Jayyousi, the
testifying officers in Novaton "conducted real-time video and foot surveillance of the several
suspected drug conspirators, while simultaneously listening to their conversations." Id.
Thus, they were able to confirm by first-hand observation that no fifteen-year-old girl was
present. Id.
92. Id. at 1122.
93. See id. at 1125; FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note (1972 proposed rules).
94. 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert.denied, Abraham v. United States,
2012 WL 1106877, 80 U.S.L.W. 3613 (Apr. 30, 2012).
95. Id. at 1110.
96. Id. at 1126-27.
97. Id. at 1127.
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The Eleventh Circuit once again took a capacious view of lay opinion
testimony in United States v. Hill." The case concerned an alleged
mortgage fraud scheme perpetrated by various defendants. 9 At trial,
the government called numerous representatives of lending institutions,
which had been allegedly defrauded by the defendants, to testify about
how misrepresentations in a loan application would affect their approval
decisions. One defendant objected to this line of questioning, arguing
that the witnesses first needed to be qualified as experts in order to
provide such testimony.'o He asserted that "the ability to answer
hypothetical questions is the essential difference between expert and lay
witnesses." 1 x
The court observed that "Rule 701 does not prohibit lay witnesses from
testifying based on particularized knowledge gained from their own
personal experiences."0 2 Indeed, in amending Rule 701, the Advisory
Committee expressly recognized a business officer's ability to testify as
to the manner in which a company conducts its business, so long as the
testimony is based on particularized knowledge acquired in the witness's
corporate role.10 ' The court pronounced that there was little indication
that the testimony was presented for the purpose of evading Daubert
reliability requirements because "it does not take any specialized or
technical knowledge to realize that lending institutions would be
reluctant to approve a loan application if they knew that it contained
false statements about material facts."'o
Meanwhile, the court
implied (without affirmatively stating) that the district court erred by
admitting the testimony of witnesses who had no personal involvement
with the lending transactions at issue."0 ' Nevertheless, any error in
such admission was harmless because that testimony was duplicative of

98. 643 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 1048563, 80 U.S.L.W. 3596
(Apr. 23, 2012).
99. Id. at 820-23.
100. Id. at 840.
101. Id. at 841 (quoting United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir.
2005)).
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note (2000 amendment)
(citation omitted) ("[Miost courts have permitted the owner or officer of a business to testify
to the value or projected profits of the business, without the necessity of qualifying the
witness as an accountant, appraiser, or similar expert. Such opinion testimony is admitted
not because of experience, training or specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert,
but because of the particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her
position in the business. The amendment does not purport to change this analysis.").
104. Hill, 643 F.3d at 842.
105. Id.
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the testimony provided by financial representatives who were personally
involved with similar transactions.106
The Eleventh Circuit reached a comparable conclusion in United
States v. Graham,o' which also involved a mortgage fraud scheme.
This time, the witness in question was a former attorney who testified
about fraudulent real estate loans based on his own prior participation
in such schemes.'o Once again, the court determined that the testimony was admissible lay opinion testimony because it concerned
precisely the type of first-hand, experiential knowledge required by Rule
701.109 The court did, however, hint that a more "general" question-in
which the witness was asked about the definition of a real estate
purchase option-potentially fell outside the ambit of Rule 701.110
However, because the defendant himself invited this question, no
reversible error occurred."'
Meanwhile, in the products liability case Williams v. Mast Biosurgery
USA, Inc.,112 the court considered the thin lines between expert
testimony, lay opinion testimony, and testimony that is wholly inadmissible."1 ' Plaintiff Wanda Williams underwent a laproscopic procedure
to drain an ovarian cyst, which revealed dense adhesions stemming from
a prior surgery. In a subsequent procedure to correct the problem,
gynecologist Dr. Adcock inserted four pieces of SurgiWrap, a medical
device produced by defendant Mast, into Williams's abdomen to prevent
adhesions."'
Soon thereafter, Williams complained of a host of medical problems
and was referred to gastroenterologist George Yared, who observed
pieces of plastic in Williams's colon. Because Dr. Yared was unable to
remove all of the plastic pieces, Williams was referred to Dr. Robert
Brown, a general surgeon, who extracted the small plastic pieces and
removed a damaged portion of the plaintiff's colon. A fourth doctor,
pathologist Robert Nelms, examined and described the extracted plastic
materials, though the foreign bodies were never subjected to testing in
order to ascertain their composition or identity."s

106. Id.
107. 643 F.3d 885 (11th Cir. 2011).
108. Id. at 896. In fact, the witness testified that he had previously engaged in
fraudulent loaning practices for one of the defendant's co-conspirators. Id. at 897.
109. Id. at 898.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 644 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
113. Id. at 1313.
114. Id. at 1313-14.
115. Id. at 1314.
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116
The district
Williams sued Mast, alleging a manufacturing defect.
treating
by
Williams's
court significantly limited the testimony proffered
Yared
Dr.
of
testimony
expert
the
only
physicians"' and permitted
The
injuries.'"
Williams's
that the foreign bodies he removed caused
the
was
SurgiWrap
that
court declined to allow Dr. Yared to testify
concluthis
for
foundation
source of the foreign bodies, as he lacked
sion. 19 The court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of
Mast because Williams had produced no admissible evidence that the
SurgiWrap was defective.' 20
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit commented that "[t]he testimony of
treating physicians presents special evidentiary problems that require
great care and circumspection by the trial court."' 2 ' This is particularly true when physician testimony may "purport to provide explanations
of scientific and technical information not grounded in their own
observations and technical experience."'2 2 Applying United States v.
Henderson,'2 the court observed that the testimony of a treating
physician may be admitted as lay opinion when it concerns personal
observations regarding the doctor's decision-making process in treating
the patient.'2 4 The court noted, however, that "when a treating
physician's testimony is based on a hypothesis, not the experience of
treating the patient, it crosses the line from lay to expert testimony, and
it must comply with the requirements of Rule 702 and the strictures of
Daubert.""'

116. Id.
117. See id. at 1315. Although the district court admitted as lay opinion testimony Dr.
Adock's observations regarding his treatment of Williams, the court declined to admit his
statements that the SurgiWrap had failed to dissolve as intended. According to the district
court, Dr. Adcock lacked experience with either SurgiWrap or plastics generally, and had
not reviewed medical literature or conducted tests. Furthermore, Dr. Brown's testimony
constituted lay opinion, and he admitted he did not know what caused Williams's colon
perforation. Lastly, while Dr. Nelms produced a report professing that the removed
materials were SurgiWrap, he based this statement solely on the label of the sample
provided to him and not based on his own verification of its composition. Id.
118. Id. According to the court, Dr. Yared performed a differential diagnosis, ruling
out alternative causal factors until he was left with the opinion that foreign bodies caused
the fistula. This constituted an established methodology for Daubert purposes. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1316. Though Dr. Adcock asserted that the product was defective, his
testimony on this subject was barred. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1317.
123. 409 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005).
124. Williams, 644 F.3d at 1317.
125. Id. at 1317-18; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.

1252

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

With this doctrinal understanding, the Eleventh Circuit assessed
Williams's contention that the district court should have admitted as lay
testimony the physician statements identifying the removed foreign
The court determined, contrary to
substances as SurgiWrap.126
of the substance did not impact the
nature
the
Williams's argument, that
27
Indeed, the physicians discarded the
physicians' treating decisions.'
extracted pieces and never sought to identify their provenance. Rather,
the physicians were concerned with the mere presence of the foreign
substance and its possible health ramifications.' 2 8
The court also examined the only testimony in which a witness
ascribed a defect to SurgiWrap: Dr. Adcock's statements that the device
failed to perform as intended.'29 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that such an opinion was "outside the ken of a lay witness
because it must be premised on scientific or other specialized knowledge."'
Given that Williams produced no evidence that a manufacturing defect caused her injury, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's summary judgment ruling.'3 '
As the Williams opinion makes clear, one of the hallmarks of expert
testimony is the witness's ability to propose a hypothesis to jurors-a
privilege denied to lay opinion witnesses. Because a hypothesis entails
the attendant risk of error, courts seek to ensure that an expert witness
arrives at the hypothesis by reliable methods that jurors may credit. To
meet this objective, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a "rigorous threepart inquiry" requiring courts to ensure the following: (1) the expert is
qualified to testify competently on the subject matter; (2) the testimony
helps the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact at
issue, by applying scientific, technical, or specialized expertise; and (3)
the methodology satisfies Daubert's reliability criteria."a2 In examining
a methodology's reliability, Daubertinstructs courts to appraise various
non-exhaustive factors, including the following: "(1) whether the expert's

126. Williams, 644 F.3d at 1318.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The court did not read Williams's appeal as challenging the district court's
Daubert analysis, and thus had no occasion to review those conclusions. See id. at 1318
n.5.
131. Id. at 1321.
132. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). The proponents
of the expert testimony bear the burden of proving each requirement by a preponderance
of the evidence. See Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1194 (11th Cir.
2010).
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theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate
of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community."1 3
Although Daubert decisions were arguably overshadowed by lay opinion
decisions in the Eleventh Circuit's 2011 term, two Daubertcases warrant
a brief mention.
In Sumner v. Biomet, Inc.,'3 plaintiff Elizabeth Sumner was injured
after undergoing a hip replacement surgery involving the installation of
a hip prosthesis manufactured by defendant Biomet. In a post-operative
appointment, x-rays revealed that particulate debris had surrounded the
prosthesis. After experiencing severe pain, Sumner had the prosthesis
removed and replaced. Sumner filed a strict liability claim against
Biomet, claiming the hip prosthesis was defective.3 5
Sumner retained only one expert witness, Dr. Rex McLellan, a
metallurgist. Dr. McLellan photographed the prosthesis, analyzed it
under a scanning electron microscope, and used energy dispersive x-ray
scans to map out its chemical composition. Dr. McLellan provided an
expert report in which he detailed his theory that scratches and gouges
on the ball of the hip prosthesis were caused by metal particles that had
become dislodged or ejected from the hip prosthesis due to the uneven
chemical composition of the metal.136 At deposition, Dr. McLellan
acknowledged that he had no confirmable explanation for how the
metallic ejection occurred."' Dr. McLellan's theories largely corresponded with that of a defense expert, who testified that tungsten
carbide may have caused the scratching and gouging on the prosthesis.138 Unlike Dr. McLellan, however, the defense experts submitted
that the tungsten resulted from a source external to the hip prosthesis,
possibly introduced during surgical implantation."3 s

133. McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
134. 434 F. App'x 834 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
135. Id. at 835-36.
136. Id. at 836.
137. Id. at 837. Specifically, Dr. McLellan testified that he "d[id] not understand the
basic micro-mechanism of how material is ejected or ablated" and could not identify how
the ejections occurred "without doing experiments or . . . calculations, which would be
incredibly difficult to do." Id. Although he opined that pressure applied to the prosthesis
may have generated the ejections, he warned that this hypothesis was only "speculation."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. at 838 n.3.
139. Id. Dr. McLellan, by contrast, concluded that the tungsten carbide must have
derived from the manufacturing process because no evidence suggested it was introduced
during surgery. Id. at 838.

1254

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

The district court granted Biomet summary judgment after concluding
that Sumner had failed to prove that Dr. McLellan used a reliable
methodology to reach his conclusions.4 o On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, declaring that the plaintiffs "provided no basis for
assessing the reliability of Dr. McLellan's opinion"-a conclusion
strengthened by the fact that Dr. McLellan's "exact opinion of the defect
that caused the prosthesis to fail is itself difficult to ascertain from the
record."14 ' Turning to Daubert's reliability factors, the court stated
that Dr. McLellan's theory was "virtually incapable of being tested," as
confirmed by his own testimony." Moreover, Dr. McLellan could not
identify publications or studies corroborating his theory that lack of
chemical homogeneities can affect metal alloys and lead to particle
dislodgement."' This also meant that Sumner failed to prove that the
theory had been subjected to peer review." In light of the apparent
paucity of scientific studies, Sumner also failed to satisfy the third and
fourth Daubert factors: the known or potential rate of error of the
particular scientific technique and the theory's general acceptance in the
The court also commented that the district
scientific community."
court did not abuse its discretion by considering the fact that Dr.
McLellan appeared to have developed his theory for purposes of the
He had never tested or published anything related to the
litigation.'
theory, the court observed, and there was no evidence he developed the
theory in research conducted separate from the litigation."'
Although courts must engage in a "rigorous three-part inquiry"148
before admitting expert testimony under Rule 702, the Eleventh Circuit
has also instructed that "it is not the role of the district court to make

140. Id. at 840.
141. Id. at 841.
142. Id. at 842.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The plaintiffs contended they produced five citations from a professional
journal describing the scientific principles underlying Dr. McLellan's theory. The court did
not consider these citations, however, because Dr. McLellan never mentioned these
citations in his deposition and the plaintiffs never filed them with the court (although
Biomet received the list of citations and attached it to a reply brief). See id. at 842 n.9.
146. Id. at 842-43.
147. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amendment)
(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)) (stating
that Daubertanalysis concerns "[w]hether experts are 'proposing to testify about matters
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the
litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying'").
148. Frazier,387 F.3d at 1260.
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ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence.""" This distinction proved pivotal in Rosenfeld v. Oceania
Cruises, Inc.,"so in which the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district
court abused its discretion by precluding the plaintiff's expert from
testifying. 5 1 The plaintiff in Rosenfeld sought to recover damages
from a cruise operator for injuries incurred when she slipped on a
ceramic tile floor. The plaintiff offered the testimony of a floor-safety
specialist, who performed coefficient-of-friction tests to ascertain the slip
resistance of the ship's flooring surfaces. According to the specialist, the
flooring surfaces were inadequate because, under wet conditions, the low
coefficient-of-friction posed a high risk of slip-and-fall accidents. The
district court, however, barred the testimony, reasoning that questions
concerning whether the floor was unreasonably safe for its intended use
were conclusions properly left to the trier of fact."5
In reversing the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[a]
qualified expert who uses reliable testing methodology may testify as to
While the district
the safety of a defendant's choice of flooring."'
court found that the expert's testimony would be unhelpful to the jury,
the Eleventh Circuit pronounced instead that "matters of slip resistance
and surface friction are 'beyond the understanding and experience of the
average lay citizen.'" 54 The court further determined that, based on
the facts of the case, the defendant's specific objections concerning the
reliability of the floor specialist's methods touched upon the witness's
Lastly, the court concluded that
persuasiveness, not admissibility.'
the district court's error was not harmless because the court had barred
the plaintiff from admitting evidence to prove the inadequacy of the
flooring surface-the central issue of the negligence claim.1 56
V.

RELEVANCY AND PREJUDICE

The gate-keeping function of the Federal Rules of Evidence is perhaps
best exemplified by controversies rooted in Rule 403,1"' in which the

149. Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir.
2003).
150. 654 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2011).
151. See id. at 1194.
152. Id. at 1191-92.
153. Id. at 1193.
154. Id. at 1194 (quoting United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985)).
155. Id. (quoting Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1346) (stating that "Oceania can raise these
arguments on retrial through'vigorous cross-examination'and'presentation of contrary evidence'").
156. Id.
157. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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interplay between relevance and prejudice is thrown into sharp relief.
Whereas Rules 401158 and 402159 underscore the truth-seeking func-

tion of relevant evidence, Rule 403 cautions that "[t]he court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . .. unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence." 6 0 Invariably, the Eleventh Circuit's criminal
docket is teeming with controversial subjects that threaten to inflame
passions and distract jurors from their proper role as impartial
adjudicators. The court's 2011 term contained no shortage of such cases,
with issues playing upon violence, sex, and class-based stereotypes.
In United States v. Langford,' the former mayor of Birmingham
was convicted on sixty-one counts of corruption, ranging from bribery to
tax fraud.16 2 He challenged his conviction on various evidentiary
grounds, largely related to prejudice. Specifically, Langford argued that
the district court abused its discretion by admitting tax records
documenting his sizable gambling winnings-winnings with no direct
relation to his alleged malfeasance.'63 Langford asserted that exposing
jurors to this evidence led them to infer that his winnings were rigged
by his bribers or would otherwise negatively influence the jurors' notions
of his character." 4
The trial court concluded that the tax records as a whole were highly
relevant to the tax fraud charges at issue because they revealed that
Langford failed to report the cash, clothing, and jewelry he allegedly
received from corrupt sources. At trial, Langford sought to cure this
obvious difficulty by stipulating that the cash, clothing, and jewelry had
not been reported. 6 1 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit pronounced that
the government had every right to decline his offer because a stipulation
may have blunted the full evidentiary force of the government's case.16

158. FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule 401 provides that "[elvidence is relevant if: (a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Id.
159. FED. R. EVID. 402. According to Rule 402, all relevant evidence is admissible
unless its inclusion is proscribed by the U.S. Constitution, a federal statute, other
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court. Id.
160. FED. R. EvID. 403.
161. 647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1121 (2012).
162. Id. at 1314.
163. See id. at 1323-24. Langford's tax returns from 2003 to 2005 reported gambling
earnings of $28,040, $4,200, and $80,510, respectively. Id.
164. Id. at 1324.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87, 189 (1997)).
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Langford also sought to redact the gambling entries, and the district
court refused, reasoning that redaction might have exacerbated the
prejudice by prompting jurors to speculate that Langford was engaged
in more illicit activities than legal gambling. 16 7 On this issue, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court had acted within its
discretion in declining to redact the gambling entries.'
United States v. Bradley' presented an even starker illustration of
the Eleventh Circuit's general hesitance to find error under Rule
403.170 Bradley concerned a massive Medicaid fraud scheme allegedly
perpetrated by owners of a pharmaceutical wholesaler.'7 1 At trial, the
government sought to introduce "wealth evidence," including photographs of the defendants' real estate, vehicles, watercraft, and aircraft.
The district court allowed the evidence over the defendants' objections.' 72 On appeal, the defendants argued that the government's
strategy served only to foment class enmity, pitting "a mostly workingclass jury against the wealthier defendants."
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the introduction of wealth
evidence created a risk that jurors would convict on grounds unrelated
to guilt.'74 But, nonetheless, the court observed that "evidence of
wealth or extravagant spending may be admissible when relevant to
issues in the case and where other evidence supports a finding of
guilt."'7 In weighing Rule 403's probative-prejudice balance, the court
determined that the wealth evidence was probative of motive, "even if

167. Id.
168.

Id.

169. 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 94088, 80 U.S.L.W. 3443
(May 14, 2012).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating
that "Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly").
171. Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1226-27.
172. Id. at 1270.
173. Id. at 1270-71.
174. See id. at 1271 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
239 (1940)) ("Use of a defendant's wealth to appeal to class bias can be 'highly improper'
and can deprive that defendant of a fair trial.").
175. Id. The court reached an analogous holding in United States v. Hill, which we
discussed above. In Hill, one of the defendants argued that the district court erred by
admitting evidence of the amount of loss resulting from the mortgage fraud and money
laundering schemes. The defendant contended that the large sums were prejudicial and
irrelevant because only the fact of loss needed to be proven. Hill, 643 F.3d at 843. The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, stating that "the victims' loss is related enough to the
defendants' gain to bear on the motive that the defendants had for committing the fraud."
Id. The court commented that "with financial crimes, the more money, the more motive."
Id.
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only slightly so."6 In proving motive, the government needed to
explain why the defendants would engage in fraudulent practices even
though their company's legitimate operations comprised more than
97.5% of their business.'7 7 To do so, the government had to demonstrate not only that the defendants derived substantial profits from the
fraudulent activity, but that the fraud furthered their lavish lifestyle.17 On the other side of the coin, the court reasoned that the
wealth evidence was "only slightly prejudicial."'7 ' To the extent jurors
could be influenced by class bias, the record already reflected the
substantial profits earned by the defendants' company, which clearly
established their affluence."8 o Thus, the court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wealth evidence's
probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of
prejudice.'
The disputed evidence in United States v. Gamoryl8 ' proved to be a
different matter entirely. Defendant Edgar Gamory was convicted on
On
drug-related offenses for which he received a life sentence.'
appeal, Gamory challenged the district court's admission of a rap video
produced by his music studio, Hush Money Entertainment." In the
video, rap artist Tone Flowa recited expletive-laden lyrics referencing
drugs, sex, violence, and threats against police. Gamory himself was not
The government argued the video was,
present in the video."
nonetheless, relevant because: (1) it disconfirmed Gamory's assertions
that he ran legitimate businesses because the lyrics linked drug money
to Hush Money and suggested his businesses were covers for a drug ring;
(2) the lyrics mentioned "an off-white crib with a Rover parked out
front," which possibly alluded to Gamory's car and studio; and (3) the
artist wore a necklace with a "JB"" insignia, resembling cuff links
87
seized from Gamory's house.1

176. Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1272.
177. Id.
178. See id. The court's opinion was silent regarding whether the prosecution
presented evidence that the defendants' luxuries were themselves the fruits of the fraud.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 635 F.3d 480 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 826 (2011).
183. Id. at 489.
184. Id. at 488, 492.
185. Id. at 488.
186. "JB"was one of Gamory's nicknames. Id. at 485.
187. Id. at 488 n.9.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred by
The court acknowledged that the rap video
admitting the video.'
bore some relevancy but determined its probative value was "minimal at
best.""' Gamory did not appear in the video,so and the government
produced no evidence that Gamory wrote the lyrics or agreed with the
song's message.' Turning to prejudice, the court commented that the
violent, profane, sexualized, and misogynistic nature of the rap lyrics
posed a "substantial danger of unfair prejudice."'9 2 Measuring the
Rule 403 balance, the court concluded that the video's probative value
Ultimately,
was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice."'
as
was
harmless,
error
court's
however, the court held that the district
guilt.'
of
Gamory's
evidence
the record reflected overwhelming
VI. AUTHENTICATION
Article IX of the Federal Rules of Evidence delineates the burden of
authentication, which is a party's duty to "produce evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is."
Though the restyling effort of the Advisory Committee sought to add
clarity to the Rules, the opaque and indeterminate wording of the
original Rule 901 remains. Thus, courts are potentially afforded
significant interpretive discretion to decide what counts as adequate
authentication.

188. Id. at 494.
189. Id. at 493.
190. Id. at 488. A comparable issue arose in the Jayyousi opinion discussed above. In
that case, the district court allowed the jury to watch a CNN interview with Osama bin
Laden, despite the fact that (as in Gamory) none of the defendants actually appeared in
the video. See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1107-08. Defendants Hassoun and Jayyousi had
mentioned the video in a telephone conversation, though there was no evidence that
defendant Padilla discussed it or even watched it. Id. at 1108. In Jayyousi, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled there was no Rule 403 error because the district court "mitigated the
prejudice to the defendants by instructing the jury to consider the video not for its truth,
but rather as state of mind evidence against Hassoun and Jayyousi [but not Padilla]." Id.
191. Gamory, 635 F.3d at 493.
192. Id.
193. See id. The court also found that the rap video constituted inadmissible hearsay,
in violation of Rule 801(c). Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' means a statement
that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.").
Based on evidence in the record, the court determined that both the government and the
district court considered the video relevant in proving the truth of the matters asserted by
the rap lyrics. Gamory, 635 F.3d at 493.
194. See id. at 494 (discussing testimony from Gamory's co-conspirators detailing his
involvement in drug trafficking).
195. FED. R. EviD. 901(a).
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The Eleventh Circuit underscored the importance of proper authenticaThe case
tion methods in Burchfield v. CSX Transportation, Inc.'
stemmed from a railcar accident that left plaintiff Doug Burchfield
without the use of his legs. Prior to sustaining his injuries, Burchfield
had helped transport a railcar between tracks while employed at a
General Mills cereal processing plant. Shortly thereafter, the railcar
rolled down a hill and crashed into other railcars, which then collided
with Burchfield. Burchfield sued CSX Transportation, which had
delivered the railcar to General Mills. At trial, Burchfield contended
that the railcar's sudden descent was caused by a defective hand
brake."' CSX countered that the accident was instead precipitated by
Burchfield's failure to properly apply the hand brake. 9 8 The jury
entered a verdict in CSX's favor."'
On appeal, the parties argued over the district court's admission of a
post-accident video.200 The video purported to show the same railcar
involved in the accident stationed in two locations: (1) the site where the
brake failure allegedly occurred; and (2) a location with an even steeper
slope.2 0 ' In both instances, the railcar remained stationary when the
hand brake was activated. 202 Burchfield contended that the video was
presented at trial as a "recreation" of the accident, and as such, CSX was
required to lay a proper foundation203 and ensure that the testing was
For its part,
performed under "substantially similar conditions."'
CSX asserted that the video was properly authenticated under Rule 901
and that no showing of substantial similarity is required when

196. 636 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
197. Id. at 1332.
198. Id. at 1336.
199. Id. at 1333.
200. Id. The video was produced by a railroad expert hired by General Mills, which
solicited the video in conjunction with an Occupational Safety and Health Administration
investigation of the accident. Id. at 1332-33.
201. Id. at 1333.
202. Id.
203. See Barnes v. General Motors Corp., 547 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1977). In Bonner v.
City of Prichard,the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the
former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
204. Burchfield, 636 F.3d at 1334; see also Barnes, 547 F.2d at 277 (citations omitted)
("As a general rule, the district court has wide discretion to admit evidence of experiments
conducted under substantially similar conditions. However, the burden is upon the party
offering evidence of out-of-court experiments to lay a proper foundation demonstrating a
similarity of circumstances and conditions.").
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experimental tests are introduced merely to demonstrate "general
scientific principles. 2 0 5
According to the Eleventh Circuit, CSX's own statements at trial
contradicted its claims that the video was not presented to jurors as a
recreation.20 6 On numerous occasions, CSX described the video to
jurors as having "utilized the same car with the same load and the same
mechanical condition at two locations."207 Furthermore, during crossexamination of Burchfield's expert witnesses, defense counsel suggested
that the video simulated accident conditions and asked the experts to
weigh in on the tests.208
Having found that CSX introduced the video as a recreation, the
Eleventh Circuit next concluded that CSX failed to lay a proper
foundation.20
In this regard, CSX's witness provided only visual
observations of the testing conditions and did not testify as to how the
tests were actually conducted. 210 Lastly, having found that the district
court abused its discretion, the court determined that the error was not
harmless. 211 Rather, the video "spoke directly to the ultimate disputed
issue in the case"-as highlighted by CSX's repeated allusions to its
contents.212 The Eleventh Circuit held that the harm to Burchfield
could only be cured by reversing the district court and remanding the
case for a new trial.21 3
The burden of authentication took center stage again in United States
v. Lanzon.214 Defendant Keith Lanzon was sentenced to sixty months
imprisonment for attempting to coerce a minor to engage in sexual

205. Burchfield, 636 F.3d at 1334 (quoting Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 566
(5th Cir. 2006) ("When the demonstrative evidence is offered only as an illustration of
general scientific principles, not as a reenactment of disputed events, it need not pass the
substantial similarity test."); McKnight ex rel. Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d
1396, 1401 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[Wlhere the experimental tests do not purport to recreate the
accident, but instead the experiments are used to demonstrate only general scientific
principles, the requirement of substantially similar circumstances no longer applies.")).
206. Id. at 1335.
207. Id. (quoting CSX's closing argument) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defense
counsel also implied that the video proved the brake met efficiency standards. See id. at
1336 (quoting same) ("'That, ladies, is an efficient handbrake."').
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1337.
210. Id. For instance, the witness could not describe the manner in which the hand
brake was applied in the video. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1338.
214. 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 333 (2011).
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activity.215 On appeal, he argued that the district court erred by
admitting into evidence instant message transcripts of conversations
between Lanzon and undercover detective George Clifton, who had posed
216
as a male offering a sexual liaison with a fourteen-year-old.
Lanzon argued that exclusion of the instant message transcripts was
necessary because Detective Clifton had deliberately destroyed the
original chat logs. At trial, Detective Clifton testified that he pasted the
instant message conversations into a Microsoft Word document and
transferred the file onto a floppy disc from which a hard copy could be
printed. Detective Clifton never saved the Word document onto his hard
drive, however. According to Lanzon's forensic expert, this meant that
the document's metadata was not preserved; thus, it could not be
determined whether Detective Clifton manipulated the original. For his
part, Detective Clifton testified to the following: (1) he saved the
transcripts on a floppy disc rather than his hard drive to conserve
memory; (2) his preservation methods conformed with protocol he
learned at the police department; and (3) he knew the conversations had
been recorded in their entirety because, when he transferred the
transcript, he compared the Word document with the original chat
screens.2 17
Lanzon attempted to discredit the chat logs through various evidentiary challenges, all of which were rejected by the Eleventh Circuit. 218
The court determined that the chat transcripts did not violate Rule 901's
authentication requirement because the evidence had been confirmed by
the "testimony of a witness with knowledge."21 1 It was immaterial
that the authenticating witness, Detective Clifton, was the very person
Lanzon accused of document tampering because circuit precedent
confirmed that transcripts may be admitted "even when a person who
was involved with creating them testified about their authenticity."2 2 0
Nor did destruction of the chat log violate the best evidence rule
because Rule 1004 provides that duplicates may suffice so long as the
original document was destroyed through no act of bad faith.2 2'

215. Id. at 1296, 1298.
216. See id. at 1296.
217. Id. at 1296-97.
218. Id. at 1298.
219. Id. at 1301; FED. R. EviD. 901(b)(1).
220. Lanzon, 639 F.2d at 1301 (citing United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1577
(11th Cir. 1995)).
221. Id. at 1301-02; see also FED. R. EVID. 1004(a) (providing that "[a]n original is not
required and other evidence of the content of a writing, recording, or photograph is
admissible if: (a) all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in
bad faith"). In addressing a separate due process argument, the court had earlier ruled
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Lastly, the admission of the transcripts did not infringe Rule 106's
completeness requirement because Lanzon produced no evidence that the
transcript had been altered and did not suggest how any additional
material would "'qualify, explain, or place into context' the portion
admitted into evidence."222
VII. JUROR MIscoNDucT
Among the common law principles undergirding the Federal Rules of
Evidence, few have proven more enduring than the judicial values
embraced by Rule 606(b).223 Rule 606(b) seeks to ensure the secrecy
of jury deliberations by placing strict limits on the admission of juror
testimony to impeach a verdict.'" Because an absolute bar on such
testimony would run afoul of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment 225 right to an impartial jury,226 the Rule allows a juror to testify about whether: "(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering
the verdict on the verdict form."227 Federal courts have generally
interpreted these exceptions narrowly.2 " Even so, the risk of a juror
being exposed to an improper influence is magnified in high profile cases
where media coverage threatens to penetrate the black box of jury
deliberations. The Eleventh Circuit heard appeals in two such cases in
2011.

that Lanzon adduced no evidence that Detective Clifton destroyed the original files in bad
faith. See Lanzon, 639 F.3d at 1300-01.
222. Id. at 1302 (quoting United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1359 (11th Cir.
2004)); see also FED. R. EVID. 106 ("If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other
part-or any other writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered
at the same time.").
223. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
224. See id. Rule 606(b)(1) provides: "ProhibitedTestimony or OtherEvidence. During
an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of
anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning
the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a
juror's statement on these matters." FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
226. Id. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury . . .
227. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
228. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 122 (1987) (holding that juror
intoxication is not an "outside influence" about which jurors may testify under Rule 606(b)).

1264

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

United States v. Siegelman 229 involved the appeals of former Alabama governor Don Siegelman and HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy,
who were convicted on counts of federal funds bribery and honestservices fraud. 23 0 In a post-trial motion, the defendants attached news
articles and juror affidavits suggesting that some jurors were exposed to
extraneous information during the trial. Based upon this evidence, the
district court concluded that the defendants had made a colorable
showing of extrinsic influence. The court held a hearing and questioned
jurors regarding what they had seen. Ultimately, the district court
determined there was credible evidence that jurors had been exposed to
extraneous information but concluded these influences were harmless. 231
The Eleventh Circuit agreed.2 32 Without much difficulty, the court
held harmless the jurors' exposure to extrinsic materials explaining the
proper role of a foreperson.m The information was accessed from the
district court's own website, had been introduced by a juror as opposed
to an outside influence, and was unrelated to the substantive issues in
the case.234 Potentially more problematic, some jurors had also been
exposed to an unredacted superseding indictment, again accessed via the
court's website. 235 This, too, was deemed harmless. 236 The charging
document had merely been edited to remove duplicative counts; thus,
exposure to the unredacted version would not have yielded any ancillary
information, factual or legal.23 ' There was also evidence that some
jurors had been inadvertently exposed to media coverage about the
trial.2 38 These media exposures, however, were quite minimal, and
there was no evidence that the jury discussed the press coverage during
deliberations.
Having disposed of the defendants' extrinsic evidence challenges, the
court next turned to what it characterized as "a very different prob-

229. 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011).
230. Id. at 1164.
231. Id. at 1182-83.
232. Id. at 1183.
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1183-84.
236. See id. at 1184.
237. Id.
238. Id. ("These jurors testified that, despite their best efforts, they had overheard
snippets of television coverage or seen headlines regarding the case in newspapers or
online.").
239. Id. at 1184-85.
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lem."24 In anonymous mailings, the defendants had allegedly been
sent copies of e-mail exchanges between jurors.2 1 The defendants
contended these e-mails proved that jurors had both prematurely
deliberated and deliberated outside the presence of the full jury, thereby
violating the Sixth Amendment.2 42
Rejecting this challenge,24 1 the court alluded to the "near-universal
and firmly established common-law rule flatly prohibiting the use of
juror testimony to impeach a verdict." 4 By shielding juror deliberations from public scrutiny, the court continued, Rule 606(b) encourages
full and frank discussions in the jury room, prevents post-trial jury
tampering and harassment, ensures finality, and restores public
confidence in the verdict.2 45 In light of these strong policy considerations, the court declared that the law "both anticipates and tolerates
some level of imperfection in the [jury] system."246
Unlike the exposures to extraneous information, there was no evidence
the e-mail exchanges implicated any of the exceptions to Rule 606(b).24 7 Therefore, even assuming the e-mails were both authentic and
clearly demonstrated juror misconduct, jurors could not even be
questioned about their contents.24 8 Moreover, even if premature
deliberations occurred, there was no reasonable possibility of prejudice.14 ' The government's case was strong, the jurors deliberated at
length, and the split nature of the verdict-where Siegelman was
acquitted on many of the charges-suggested that the jurors carefully
weighed the evidence. 2"o Accordingly, the court concluded that no new
trial was warranted.251
In United States v. Snipes,M2 the Eleventh Circuit was confronted
with even graver allegations of juror misconduct. After actor Wesley
Snipes was convicted of tax evasion, his lawyers were allegedly sent e-

240. Id. at 1185.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1185-86.
246. Id. at 1185. In this regard, the court remarked that the judiciary does not inquire
into whether a verdict was the product of compromise or mistake and that it even tolerates
inconsistent verdicts and jury nullification. Id. at 1185 & n.36.
247. Id. at 1186 n.37.
248. Id. at 1187.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 440 F. App'x 709 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
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mails from former jurors detailing misconduct during jury deliberations.25 3 The e-mails described how some jurors admitted they had
judged Snipes's guilt before trial. The e-mails additionally alleged that,
to reach a unanimous verdict, the jurors compromised by convicting
Snipes only on the lesser counts. The jurors also speculated about
Snipes's possible punishment. Snipes filed motions for a new trial and
leave to interview jurors.2 54
In appealing the district court's denial of these motions, Snipes offered
two reasons why Rule 606(b) did not bar his motions. First, the e-mails
were outside the scope of Rule 606: they were not offered to show errors
in the jurors' deliberative process, but rather to demonstrate that the
jurors committed perjury in voir dire by swearing that they accepted the
presumption of innocence. Second, even if Rule 606(b) did apply, the emails fell within Rule 606(b)'s exceptions concerning extraneous
information or improper influences. 2 s
The Eleventh Circuit indicated that, notwithstanding Snipes's voir dire
argument, Rule 606(b)'s general exclusionary provision covered "any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations."256 Citing Siegelman, the court held that "although it is improper for jurors to consider a defendant's potential penalty during deliberations, proof of such conduct does not establish grounds for a new
trial."257 Circuit precedent also established that Rule 606(b)'s exception for extraneous information "does not permit testimony that a juror
admitted, during deliberations, that she prejudged the defendant's
guilt."258 Finally, even if the e-mails could be admissible, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the juror misconduct
fell short of the "clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence
of the type of misconduct that would warrant a new trial. 2 59

253. Id. at 710. The emails were sent over two years after the deliberations, leading
the district court to question their veracity. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 710-11.
256. Id. at 712; FED. R. Evin. 606(b).
257. Snipes, 440 F. App'x at 711 (citing Siegelman, 640 F.3d at 1187).
258. Id. at 712 (citing United States v. Venske, 296 F.3d 1284, 1287-88, 1290 (11th Cir.
2002)).
259. Id.

